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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of
U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(b) (1996), as an appeal of a civil matter from final judgments of a district
court. This matter has been certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(3) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was it error for the trial court to grant appellee Metropolitan Insurance

Company's motion to dismiss the appellant's petition for adjudication of marriage for failure
to adjudicate the petition within one year? Is the one year time limitation set forth in U.C.A.
§30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to appellant Juanita Gonzalez
(hereinafter referred to as "Juanita")? In light of the fact that neither potential husband nor
wife objected to adjudicating the appellant's marriage petition more than one year after the
termination of the relationship, (assuming arguendo that the relationship terminated), did the
court's granting of summary judgment based on the time limitation deprive Juanita Gonzalez
of her constitutional rights, in violation of the open court's provision of the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 11, the Equal Protection Clause of the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 24, and the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section
7?
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's denial of Juanita's

motion to dismiss appellee Metropolitan Insurance Company's (hereinafter referred to as

2

^Metropolitan") complaint in intervention, given the fact that Metropolitan had already
issued a denial of Juanita Gonzalez's claim under the Metropolitan homeowner's policy?
3.

Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition to allege

that her relationship to Martin Briceno had not terminated, given the fact that there was no
conflicting evidence, and given the fact that the couple had periods of estrangement and
reconciliation during their thirteen year relationship? Was there sufficient evidence for the
trial court to find that the facts demonstrated that Juanita's proposed amendment to her
petition for adjudication would be futile, and that there were no facts to support a continuous
relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended petition?
4.

Was there sufficient evidence for the Court to find that Metropolitan would be

prejudiced by an amendment of the petition?
5.

Did the trial court err in granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment

based on Juanita's failure to comply with the statutory time limitation as set forth in U.C.A.
§30-1-4.5, given the fact that Metropolitan never pleaded this defense in its complaint in
intervention?
6.

Did the trial court err in weighing the evidence and in resolving the matter of

Juanita's credibility upon a motion for summary judgement, in light of the fact that she was
not allowed the opportunity to testify before the court?
7.

Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's granting of Metropolitan's
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motion for summary judgment?
8.

Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion
to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention?
9.

Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion
to amend her petition?
10. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to alter the court's findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order with regard to the court's granting of Metropolitan's
motion for summary judgment?
11. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to alter the court's findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion to
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
Appellant preserved the above issues in the trial court as follows:
Issues Regarding Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment:
1.

Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Record 190 -

2.

Affidavit of Juanita Gonzalez in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to

203)

Motion to Dismiss. (Record 185 -187)
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3.

Summary of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Record 209 -

4.

Objection to Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

211)

Order Granting Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record 402 - 405)
5.

Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding

Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record 412 - 415)
6.

Petitioner's Proposed Order Granting Metropolitan's Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Record 416 - 418)
7.

Petitioner's Motion and Memorandum to Alter the Findings. (Record 437 - 441)

8.

Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460)

Issues Regarding Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Adjudication of Marriage:
9.

Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Adjudication and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities. (Record 204 - 205)
10. Petitioner's Proposed Second Amended Petition of Adjudication of Marriage.
(Record 206 - 208)
11. Reply in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Amend. (Record 262 - 265)
12. Objection to Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Petitioner's Motion to Amend. (Record 391 - 401)
13. Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460)
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Issues Regarding Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervener's Complaint:
14. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenor s Complaint (Record 248 - 249)
15. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenors
Complaint. (Record 250 - 261)
16. Petitioner's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss. (Record 286 - 310)
17. Objection to the Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenor. (Record 379- 390)
18. Motion and Memorandum to Alter the Findings. (Record 437 - 441)
19. Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460)
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Motion for Summary Judgment. This case was dismissed pursuant to the trial

court's grant of Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment may be
granted only if the record shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
On review of a grant of summary judgment, the inquiry is whether there is any
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Because
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's
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ruling for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994), and gives no
deference to the trial court's legal determinations, Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. Utah 1993).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d231, 233 (Utah 1993).
2.

Motion to Amend Petition. The trial court denied Juanita's motion to amend

her petition for marriage adjudication. The trial court's denial of a motion to amend a
pleading will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging
Specialists, Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d
1381, 1389 (Utah 1996).
3.

Findings of Fact. Appellant challenges several of the trial court's findings of

fact. Findings of fact will not be overturned on appeal unless findings are clearly erroneous
in light of the great weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court is otherwise definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d
969, 977 (Utah 1996). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses..." Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the appellant can
show that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an
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erroneous view of the law. Western Capital & Sees., Inc.v. Knudsvig. 768 P.2d 989 (Utah
Ct. App), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).
As a prerequisite to an attack on findings of fact, the appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate "that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. . ." Grayson
Roper Ltd. V. Finlinson. 782 P.d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The marshaling requirement
supplies the reviewing court with a basis on which to conduct a meaningful and expedient
review of facts challenged on appeal.
4.

Conclusions of Law.

Appellant challenges several of the trial court's

conclusions of law. Upon appellate review, conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness,
with no deference given to the trial court. Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 980
(Utah 1996).
5.

Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court denied Juanita's motion to dismiss

Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of standing to intervene, treating it as a
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the standard of review for a motion for summary
judgment is applicable as set forth above. Furthermore, whether a party has standing is a
question of law with respect to which the appellate court accords no deference to the ruling
of the trial court. Architectural Committee of the Mt. Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 v.
Kabatznick. 949 P.2d 776, 777 (Ct. App. Utah 1997).
6.

Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
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Motions to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Appellant objected to
Metropolitan's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on the court's order
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, order denying Appellant's motion
to amend her petition, and order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss complaint in
intervention, and then moved to amend said findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of
which were denied by the trial court. Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or
not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings
or has made either a motion to amend them. . . ." The standard of review is whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the findings by the trial court.
7.

Constitutionality of Statutes. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the

time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, both on its face and as applied to Juanita
Gonzalez. The Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah. 681 P.2d
199 (Utah 1984) analyzed the constitutionality of a statute which terminates the parental
rights of the father of an illegitimate child if he fails to give the required timely notice of his
claim of paternity.

The Court held that a more stringent standard of review than

"arbitrariness" or the rational basis test was applicable because the liberty right at issue was
"fundamental" for purposes of due process. Wells, Id. at 206. The Court adopted the
following standard of review for the constitutionality of any legislation infringing on parental
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rights:
There must be a showing of:
(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved, and
(2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory
purpose".
Id. at 206, quoting In re Boyer. 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981).
The statute in the case on appeal, U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, involves an individual's right to
establish the existence of a marriage either retroactively or contemporaneously with the
relationship, or both. A person's right to marry is a liberty right which the U.S. Supreme
Court has deemed to be a "fundamental" right guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.
Zablocki v. RedhaiL 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Therefore, the constitutional analysis of the time
limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 should be undertaken by applying the more
stringent standard of review set forth in Wells.681 P.2d at 206.
The standard of review set forth in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), mandates that in order for a statute to uphold
constitutionality for due process, it must be constructed to provide notice and an opportunity
to be heard.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are relevant to a determination of this case:
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1.

The statute regarding the adjudication of common law marriage, and the time

limit for adjudication is found at Utah Code Annotated § 30- i -4.5. The full text is set forth
in Addendum A.
2.

Statutes regarding the necessity of setting forth defenses specifically in the

pleadings are found at Rule 8(c), Rule 12(a), Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. These provisions are set forth verbatim at Addendum B.
3.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary

judgment. Rule 56 is set forth in its entirety as Addendum C.
4.

Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs intervention of right.

That rule is set forth in its entirety at Addendum D.
5.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendment of pleadings

and is set forth verbatim at Addendum E.
6.

Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs findings by the court and

is set forth verbatim at Addendum F.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions are relevant to the determination of this case:
1.

Utah Const., art. I, Section 11, the "open courts" provision is set forth at

Addendum G.
2.

Utah Const,, art. I, Section 24, the "equal protection^ clause:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
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3.

Utah Const., art. I, Section 7. the "due process" clause:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1.4.5 is unconstitutional on its face, and as applied
to Juanita Gonzalez. The purpose of the statute is to administer the orderly adjudication of
common law marriages. It provides that a marriage must be adjudicated during the
relationship or within one year following the termination of the relationship. The statute
addresses two classes of individuals only, those who seek marriage adjudication of an
ongoing relationship, and those who seek marriage adjudication of a relationship in
contemplation of divorce. The statute does not address a third class of individuals to which
Juanita belongs — those persons who initiate marriage adjudication proceedings in
contemplation of divorce, but who later reconcile and seek to amend the petition to reflect
that the relationship did not terminate. The statute does not define the termination of a
relationship or define under what circumstances a relationship is to be deemed terminated.
Nor does the statute address a situation where it has been longer than one year after the
relationship has terminated, but neither potential husband nor wife objects to the passage of
time, and it is only a third party intervenor who objects to the adjudication.
The trial court denied Juanita5 s motion to amend her petition to reflect that she and
Martin had reconciled and had not terminated their relationship. The court below found as
a matter of law that when Juanita and Martin reconciled they established a "new"
12

relationship, rather than a continuation of the old relationship. The court then dismissed
Juanita"s petition because it had not been adjudicated within one year from the date reflected
on her original petition. The trial court applied the time limitation to a circumstance which
was not addressed by the Utah legislature, and not defined within the language of the statute,
resulting in the deprivation of Juanita Gonzalez' constitutional rights. The statutory time
limitation, as applied to Juanita Gonzalez, violates the open courts provision, and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court erred in granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment for the
reasons that (1) there existed a disputed material fact as to whether or not Juanita and
Martin's relationship terminated on October 21, 1995; (2) Metropolitan had not amended its
complaint in intervention to allege the defense of petitioner's failure to adjudicate the
marriage within one year of their breakup, contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
therefore the matter was not properly before the trial court; (3) the matter would have been
adjudicated within the one year time limitation had it not been for Metropolitan's
intervention, and at all times Metropolitan's conduct demonstrated a willingness to waive the
defense of the statutory time limitation, therefore Metropolitan should have been estopped
from asserting the defense; and (4) the time limitation upon which the court based its order
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment is unconstitutional on its face and/or
as applied to Juanita Gonzalez.
The trial court erred in denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition to conform to
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the evidence that she and Martin had reconciled and that their relationship had not
terminated, but was ongoing. The court's order was improper for the reason that (1) there
was no evidence before the court to support its finding that Juanita and Martin had
established a "new" relationship when they reconciled; (2) Metropolitan never raised the
issue that it would be prejudiced by the amendment, and (3) there was no evidence before
the court to support the finding that Metropolitan would be prejudiced if Juanita were
allowed to amend her petition. The record shows that the couple had a stormy relationship
with a history of domestic disputes, arguments, estrangements, separations, Juanita believing
that the relationship was over, an eventual change of heart and reconciliations. This pattern
of interaction between Juanita and Martin existed from September 1983, when they first
moved in together, through October 21, 1995 to the present. During their 13 years together
Juanita and Martin had three children together, Adrian, Jaime and Theresa. They always
kept a family home. There was no evidence before the court upon which to base its finding
that when Juanita and Martin reconciled in early 1997 it was not a continuation of their 13
year relationship.
Furthermore, Metropolitan never alleged in its memorandum opposing Juanita's
motion to amend, or in its oral argument, that it would be prejudiced if Juanita were allowed
to amend her petition. Metropolitan never produced any evidence, by way of affidavit or
otherwise, to show that it would be prejudiced. The first time the issue of prejudice to
Metropolitan was raised was in the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and
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proposed order on Juanita's motion to amend, to which Juanita objected. Juanita was never
given notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue.

In weighing the balance of

interests of Metropolitan and Juanita, it is clear that Juanita was more prejudiced by the
court's denial of her motion than Metropolitan would have been had Juanita been given leave
to amend her petition. Leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice.
There was no evidence before the court that the interest ofjustice to Metropolitan was greater
than the justice to which Juanita was entitled by allowing an amendment of her petition.
The trial court erred in denying Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint
in intervention for the reasons that after it denied Juanita's insurance claim, (1) Metropolitan
no longer met the requirements of intervention set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 24; and (2) Juanita's stipulation allowing Metropolitan to intervene was based on
misleading representations made by Metropolitan. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention
alleges that Juanita is attempting to establish her marriage with Martin in order to defraud
Metropolitan by claiming benefits under Martin's homeowner's insurance policy. The only
interest Metropolitan ever alleged is its interest in protecting itself against any fraudulent
claim for insurance benefits.

During the pendency of the proceedings, Metropolitan

unequivocally, and without reserving its rights under the policy, denied Juanita's claim for
insurance coverage and benefits, before any court ruling on the merits of her petition. By
doing so, Metropolitan's interest in protecting itself against fraud became moot, and
Metropolitan no longer had standing to intervene. Metropolitan was no longer in danger of
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being defrauded by Juanita because it was not going to pay her claim; it's interest in averting
any (perceived) insurance fraud was fully protected by its final denial of insurance coverage
and benefits. Metropolitan failed to produce any evidence to show what interest it still had
in the proceedings, and how it would be impaired or impeded in protecting its interest if its
complaint in intervention were dismissed.
Furthermore, Metropolitan intervened on the basis that Juanita's insurance claim
would depend on the trial court's ruling regarding her status as Martin Briceno's spouse.
Based on this representation, Juanita stipulated to allow intervention. Metropolitan then
denied Juanita's insurance claim before any court ruling on the merits. (Later, after its denial
of Juanita's claim, Metropolitan then moved for summary judgment based on the time
limitation.) The evidence supports Juanita's allegations that Metropolitan misled her (and
the court) into believing that the court's determination of her marriage petition would dispose
of the insurance company's obligations to her. If Metropolitan had intended to rely on the
court's ruling to dispose of its rights and obligations to Juanita, it would have awaited a court
ruling before issuing its denial to Juanita.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.
This is an appeal from three orders issued by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, pursuant to oral argument held on
June 30, 1997:
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1.

Order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, entered August

5, 1997;
2.

Order denying Juanita Gonzalez' motion to amend petition, entered August 5,

1997;and
3.

Order denying Juanita Gonzalez' motion to dismiss complaint in intervention,

entered August 5, 1997.
4.

On July 23, 1997, Juanita Gonzalez objected to the findings of fact and

conclusions of law proposed by Metropolitan on all three orders above. On August 5, 1997
the court denied Juanita's objections. This appeal is from this order.
5.

On August 15, 1997 Juanita moved to alter the findings of fact, conclusions of

law and order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, and to alter the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order denying Juanita's motion to dismiss complaint
in intervention. The trial court denied Juanita's motions to alter the findings on October 8,
1997. This appeal is from this order.

B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Juanita Gonzalez and Martin Briceno began living together in 1983. They had

three children together, a son named Adrian, a son Jaime, and a daughter, Theresa. Juanita
and Martin considered themselves to be husband and wife, although they had never
formalized their union. She referred to Martin as "my husband", and he referred to Juanita
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as iwmy wife". (Record 1) Only a few close friends and family members knew they had
never gone through a formal ceremony. (Record 107-108)
2.

During the thirteen year period that Juanita and Martin lived together, they had

several periods of estrangement. However, Martin never moved out of the family home, nor
ever removed his personal belongings or clothing, nor ever changed his address or residence.
(Record 262, Record 107)
3.

Several times Juanita called the police during domestic disputes, or when

Martin's temper raged out of control. (Record 101)
4.

On October 21, 1995, following an argument, Martin Briceno intentionally set

fire to the family home, destroying the home and all of the family's possessions. (Record
190)
5.

Martin eventually pled guilty to arson and was sentenced to the Utah State

Prison, where he is currently serving time. (Record 358)
6.

Juanita subsequently filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Property &

Casualty Insurance Company, for property loss under a homeowner's insurance policy.
(Record 11)
7.

Juanita was honest about her marital status and informed Metropolitan

representatives that she and Martin were "common law" married. A Metropolitan adjuster
told Juanita that she would need to be adjudicated as Martin Briceno's wife before
Metropolitan would cover the damage. (Record 191, Record 250)
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8.

Juanita filed her petition for marriage adjudication on January 5, 1996. (Record

9.

Metropolitan filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules

1)

of Civil Procedure, alleging that (1) Juanita was directed to file her petition for marriage
adjudication by her public adjuster, (2) solely for the purpose of defrauding Metropolitan,
'The whole purpose of this petition is to 'set up" Metropolitan" (quoted from Metropolitan's
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Intervene, p. 5.), and (3) that it would be grossly
unfair to allow Juanita to proceed with her petition without permitting Metropolitan to
present its evidence and defend its interests.

In support of its motion to intervene,

Metropolitan's memorandum reads, "Juanita Gonzalez' only hope of establishing any
insurance coverage under the Metropolitan policy depends on her claimed status as a spouse
of Martin Briceno." (Emphasis Added) (Record 10-15)
10. Based on the foregoing language quoted from Metropolitan's pleadings that the
issue of Juanita's insurance coverage depends on her marriage adjudication, and based upon
Metropolitan's prior representations to Juanita that her claim would be paid if she were
adjudicated married to Martin, Juanita stipulated to allow Metropolitan to intervene.
(Record 28-29)
11. On February 23, 1996 Metropolitan sent a letter to counsel for Juanita
acknowledging that Metropolitan had received her proof of loss and claim for benefits under
the policy. This letter states:
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%;

As your proof of loss acknowledges, the issue of whether Juanita is the
spouse of Martin is open to question and subject to adjudication. I believe
we both recognize that if Juanita is not the spouse of Martin, she has no claim
whatsoever under the policy. Accordingly, with the issue of her status
before the Court, it would be inappropriate for Metropolitan to make any
payment at this time." (Emphasis Added) (Record 304)
The letter also states that there are other serious questions regarding any coverage
Juanita might have even if she were established as Martin's spouse. It also contains the
sentence, "Metropolitan waives none of those defenses to coverage at this time." (Record
304)
12. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention alleges that "Metropolitan believes that
this petition is filed as part of an attempt to defraud an insurance company by falsely
attempting to establish a marriage where none existed." (Record 8)
13. Juanita answered Metropolitan's complaint in intervention, denying the above
allegation. (Record 26-27)
14. The parties then proceeded with discovery. In April 1996 Metropolitan sent out
more than 30 subpoenas to various governmental agencies, police departments, hospitals and
healthcare facilities, banking institutions, retailers, and others, requesting documentation.
(Record 32-33, 34-35, 37-38, 52-53, 57-58)

Furthermore, Metropolitan conducted an

extensive investigation of Juanita, including interviewing her neighbors regarding their
knowledge of Juanita's marital status. (Record 375-376)
15. On May 7,1996 Juanita filed a motion for a scheduling conference. (Record 4247) The court subsequently set July 31, 1996 as the date for the scheduling conference.
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(Record 50-51)
16. On June 4, 1996 Metropolitan denied Juanita's insurance claim, prior to any
court determination of her marital status. (Record 259) The denial letter from Jeannette
Castro, Claim Representative, to Tamara J. Hauge, attorney for Juanita Gonzalez, states (1)
that Metropolitan "formally" denies her claim, (2) on the basis that she is not the spouse of
Martin Briceno, and (3) that the denial is based, among other things, on Metropolitan's
investigation with regard to Juanita's pending petition for marriage adjudication. The exact
language of Metropolitan's denial is as follows:
Metropolitan Insurance Company hereby formally denies the claim of your
client, Juanita Gonzalez, dated June 4,1996. This denial is based upon, among
other things, the facts and information developed by our investigation with
regard to Ms. Gonzalez' pending petition in the Third Judicial District Court.
Our investigation indicates that Ms. Gonzalez was not the wife of our insured,
Mr. Briceno and, therefore, is not insured under our policy. Sincerely, Jeanette
Castro, Claim Representative.
This letter does not contain a reservation of rights provision. (Record 259)
17. At the scheduling conference held July 31, 1996 the court set the trial date for
January 7, 1997. (Record 55-56)
18. On December 6, 1996, Metropolitan's first motion for summary judgment was
heard. The motion did not allege that Juanita failed to adjudicate her marriage within the one
year statutory time limitation, although the motion was heard after the expiration of the one
year time limitation. (Record 64-82, Record 120-121) The only argument made by
Metropolitan was that Juanita and Martin could not establish a uniform reputadon as husband
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and wife. (Record 64-82, Record 120-121) Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment
was denied, the trial court finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Juanita and Martin held themselves out as husband and wife, and whether they
obtained a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. (Record 127-128)
19. The trial of January 7, 1997 was stricken by the court because a criminal matter
took precedence. (Record 149)
20. On March 19, 1997 Juanita filed a second request for a scheduling conference.
(Record 173-174) A scheduling conference was set by the court for April 8. 1997. (Record
171 -172)
21. At the scheduling conference the court set the trial date for August 5, 1997, and
a discovery cut-off date of June 13, 1997. (Record 175 -176)
22. At the scheduling conference on April 8, 1997 counsel for Juanita informed
Metropolitan's counsel that Juanita and Martin had reconciled, and that Juanita wanted to
amend her petition to conform to the fact that they had reconciled. (Record 460, p. 2)
23. On May 22 1997, in response to Metropolitan's denial of Juanita's and her
children's claims, Juanita filed in her own behalf, and as guardian ad litem for her children,
a complaint in federal court against Metropolitan, alleging breach of contract, breach of
warranty, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence,
reformation of contract, and bad faith. (Record 355-378)
24. On June 30, 1997, the following motions were heard before the Honorable
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Tyrone E. Medley:
a. Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment alleging failure to comply with the
one year time limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2)
b. Juanita's motion to amend her petition to allege that her relationship with Martin
had not terminated, but was ongoing
c. Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of
standing. (Record 460)
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Juanita submitted her affidavit and
proposed amended petition, stating that she and Martin had re-established their relationship,
that it had not terminated on October 2 K 1995, but that it was ongoing. (Record 204-207)
25. No affidavits were submitted by Metropolitan in support of its motion for
summary judgment. Metropolitan based its motion on Juanita's prior testimony in the
months shortly following the fire, during which time Juanita believed that her relationship
with Martin was irreconcilable, and on the allegation in her prior petition that she believed
their relationship was over. (Record 230-233, Record 460, pp. 1-9)
26. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention does not assert the defense that the
petitioner did not comply with the time limitations set forth in the statute for adjudication of
marriage. (Record 5-9)
27. Metropolitan never amended its complaint to assert the statutory time limits.
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The statutory time limitation was pleaded for the first time in Metropolitan's motion for
summary judgment. (Record 177-178)
28. The trial court found as a matter of law that the allowance of the proposed
amendment to state that the relationship had not terminated would be prejudicial to
Metropolitan. (Record 427) However, the record shows that Metropolitan failed to allege
that it would be prejudiced, either in its memorandum opposing Juanita's motion to amend
(Record 230-233), or in oral argument. (Record 460, pages 1-9) Metropolitan did not
submit any evidence, by way of affidavit or otherwise, to show how Metropolitan would be
prejudiced by allowing Juanita to amend her petition. (Record 230 - 233)
29. The trial court found as a matter of law that Juanita and Martin's relationship
terminated no later than October 21,1995, and the fact that they may have commenced a new
relationship does not alter that fact. (Record 427, para. 1)
30. Metropolitan failed to produce any affidavit or submit any facts evidencing that
Juanita and Martin's relationship was a "new" relationship, and not a part of their continuing
relationship. (Record 230 - 233) Metropolitan merely asserted in oral argument that it was
a "new" relationship. (Record 460, p. 7)
31. The court found as a matter of law that there were no facts to support a
continuous relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended petition. (Record 427,
para. 2)
32. Juanita's affidavit opposing Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment
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alleges as fact that she and Martin had stormy periods in their relationship and had broken
up and reunited several times in the past, and that although she thought their relationship was
over after the fire, they had reconciled again. (Record 185 -186)
33. There was no evidentiary hearing on these matters. (Record 460)
34. On October 17, 1997 Juanita and Martin were married in a civil ceremony at the
Utah State Prison. The couple is still married. (Affidavit of Juanita Gonzalez, Addendum
H.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH MARRIAGE ADJUDICATION STATUTE
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

A.

The time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) should be analyzed as a
statute of repose.

The time limitation imposed by U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose, and as such,
requires an analysis distinct from a statute of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court in Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), analyzed Utah's product liability statute
of repose, ruling it unconstitutional and in the process differentiated between statutes of
repose and statutes of limitation. In Berry, Id., at 672, the Court characterized a statute of
limitations as one that requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a
legal right has been violated; for a claimant who fails to do so, the remedy for the wrong has
been waived. The Court then characterized a statute of repose as one that "bars all actions
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after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the
occurrence of any injury that gives rise to a cause of action." Berry, Id. at 672.
The time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is set forth as follows:
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must
occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year
following the termination of that relationship.
The same characteristics exist in this time limitation as those characteristics
recognized by the Court in the products liability statute of repose. U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 requires
that the matter be determined within one year following termination of the relationship,
rather than the commencement of the relationship. If the statute required adjudication within
one year from the commencement of the relationship, it would be characterized as a statute
of limitations in that the commencement of the relationship is the act which gives rise to the
cause of action, i.e. the finding of a marital relationship. However, the statute requires
adjudication within one year from the termination of the relationship, an occurrence other
than that which gives rise to the cause of action.
Considering this Court's respective definitions of statutes of repose and statutes of
limitations, the time limitation set forth in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose, and should
be recognized as such when analyzing the constitutionality of its application in the case at
bar.
B. Statutory Interpretation of U.C.A. §30-1-4,5.
The starting point in interpreting the statute is the language of the statute itself.
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According to the plain language of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), an unsolemnized (common law)
marriage must be established either (1) during the relationship, or (2) within one year
following termination of the relationship. In interpreting statutory text, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that departures from the statutory language are permitted in
cases where the application of the unambiguous language produces an uabsurd result."
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-70 (1994). The interpretation of
U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) warrants a departure from the statutory language.
The purpose and history of the statute are relevant aids to its interpretation. The
statute was enacted to allow individuals meeting the criteria set forth therein to legitimize
their relationship by establishing their marriage retroactively. The time limitation is meant
to prevent a marriage from being adjudicated "twenty years after a relationship when the
parties had no intention of a marriage." See transcript of Senate hearings; Recognition of
Common Law Marriages, 1987: Hearing on S.B. 256; 47th Legislature, Addendum I. No
other purpose behind the time limitation was articulated by the Senate. Unfortunately, the
House Debate is unintelligible because of the quality of the tape. Clearly, the only purpose
behind the time limitation as articulated by the legislature, was to protect the potential
husband and wife against a marriage that neither intended. There is no evidence whatsoever
that the legislature intended to prevent a couple who wanted to establish a marriage from
participating in an adjudication more than one year after their relationship had terminated.
In the case at bar, Metropolitan Insurance Company, an intervenor in Juanita Gonzalez'
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petition for adjudication of marriage brought a motion for summary judgment. The order
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment was based on a strict interpretation
of the statute. Metropolitan did not argue that its rights would be prejudiced if the court
made an exception to the literal reading of the statute. Importantly, neither Juanita nor
Martin argued that extending the adjudication past the one year time limitation would
prejudice their rights.
U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) does not contemplate the situation described herein, and therefore
does not address the issue of whether two parties to an action may, by mutual agreement,
extend the time in which a judicial determination may be made. Furthermore, the statute
does not define when a relationship is terminated, the circumstances under which a
relationship is terminated, or who is empowered to decide when a relationship is terminated.
Logically, that determination is best made by one or both parties to the relationship because
they have the most intimate knowledge of the relationship. Nevertheless, contrary to Juanita
Gonzalez' unrefiited testimony that the relationship had not ended, the lower court ruled that
Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated on October 21, 1995 and that their current
relationship was a "new" relationship. With this finding, the lower court by strictly applying
the statutory language of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), ruled that Juanita had not adjudicated her
marriage within one year from October 21, 1995, and dismissed her petition.
By the lower court's ruling, the court has effectively determined that a couple who
files a petition alleging termination of the relationship and who subsequently change their
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minds and reconcile, cannot thereafter toll the statutory time limitation by amending the
petition to reflect that the relationship had not in fact terminated, and that the couple must
forge ahead with the adjudication proceedings as though they had not reconciled. This
interpretation of the statute yields an absurd and harsh result, one which serves no purpose
whatsoever.
In interpreting the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) this Court should also
consider public policy. It serves the interests of the public and the state to allow a marriage
to be adjudicated where the couple otherwise qualifies, except for the time limitation. This
is especially true where the couple has three children who will become legitimized by the
marriage. As a general rule, marriage lessens the potential financial burdens of the state to
provide cash and other benefits to dependent mothers with children. Spouses are legally
obligated to support each other, freeing the state from potential welfare and medical care
obligations which might exist if the couple were not married. Utah specifically recognizes
that it has an interest in enhancing "more stable, satisfying, and enduring marital and family
relationships." See U.C.A. §30-1-30. Further, it would seem to benefit society to allow a
father to take responsibility for his family by establishing a marriage with the mother of his
children. When parents participate in a marriage adjudication the parents' actions would
certainly seem to demonstrate to the children of the union the importance of making a
marriage commitment and a demonstration of the love that the couple bears toward each
other. Two parents' participation in a marriage adjudication can only be beneficial to their
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children who might feel stigmatized by their illegitimate status, and might feel embarrassed
and insecure about their parents' relationship.
In light of all the benefits and advantages to the family and to society as a whole, what
purpose does it serve to allow an insurance company to use the statutory time limitation to
prevent the adjudication of a marriage of a couple who has had a 13 year relationship and
three children together? Where neither potential husband nor wife objects to having the
marriage adjudicated more than one year after the couple has terminated their relationship,
there is no possible advantage to the state or the public in preventing the couple from having
their petition adjudicated. Applying the above analyses to U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), there is
ample justification for a liberal interpretation of the statute. The lower court's strict
application of the time limitation in this case lacks any principled basis. Such application
fails to recognize the purpose of the statute and the inapplicability of the one year time
limitation to the class of individuals to which Juanita belongs.

POINT H
THE UTAH MARRIAGE ADJUDICATION
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The issue of whether or not Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated or
whether it was ongoing is a material fact which, in and of itself, is enough to defeat summary
judgment, as discussed in Point V below.

Nevertheless, the trial court granted

Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. By imposing the strict one year time
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limitation under these circumstances, the court deprived Juanita Gonzalez and Martin
Briceno of their constitutional rights. The statute is overly broad in that it includes persons
such as Juanita and Martin who should be allowed, by mutual consent, to stipulate to an
extension of time for judicial determination of their marital status, or who have re-established
their relationship thus making the time limitation inapplicable. Specifically, the statute as
applied to the appellant, is unconstitutional in that it violates the open courts provision of the
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11; it violates the Due Process Clause of Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution; and violates equal protection under Article I, Section 24
of the Utah Constitution. The Constitutional violations are addressed as follows:
A.

The Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.

The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, commonly known as the "open courts"
clause, states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by
himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party.
Juanita Gonzalez has a constitutional interest in seeking a judicial determination of
her marital relationship with Martin Briceno. The United States Supreme Court has held
that marriage is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. Zablocki v.
RedhaiL 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Accordingly, the Utah legislature in enacting U.C.A. §30-14.5 has carved out a process by which Juanita and all persons similarly situated may establish
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an adjudication of marriage. However, the lower court's application of the time limitation
in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) effectively bars Juanita from prosecuting her cause in the courts of
the State of Utah, and is thus violative of the open courts provision.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar statute of repose in Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), holding that the Utah products liability statute of
repose is unconstitutional. Given this Court's consistent application of Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution to time limiting statutes such as the one at bar, it is reasonable that
the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional as applied to Juanita Gonzalez.
B.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24.

The one year time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 fails to afford Juanita equal
protection under the law because the statute makes no exception for parties who mutually
agree to extend the time past one year. Furthermore, the statute arbitrarily discriminates
between petitioners whose petitions for adjudication are not contested and who can easily
adjudicate the matter within the one year time limitation, and petitioners whose petitions for
adjudication are contested and who may be precluded from a timely adjudication by the fact
that a trial cannot be scheduled within a year because of circumstances outside the
petitioner's control. In the case at bar, Juanita Gonzalez filed her petition for marriage
adjudication on January 5, 1996. Martin Briceno was served with the petition on April 16,
1996 and did not file objections to the petition. Metropolitan Insurance Company intervened
on February 2,1996. Juanita filed a motion for scheduling conference on May 6,1996, and
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a scheduling conference was held on July 31,1996 at which time Metropolitan requested
time for discovery. Metropolitan thereafter undertook exhaustive discovery measures
including sending out approximately 35 subpoenas duces tecum to various companies for
records. The trial, which was scheduled for a second place setting for January 7, 1997, was
canceled because the first place trial took precedence. Juanita"s marriage adjudication trial
was then re-scheduled for August 1997. On April 10, 1997 Metropolitan filed its motion for
summary judgment based upon petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory time limits
of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5.
Juanita Gonzalez never caused any delays in bringing her case to trial. Had it not
been for the intervention of Metropolitan Insurance Company, and their extensive discovery
requests, Juanita's marriage adjudication could easily have been determined within the one
year time period. Juanita and Martin had re-established their relationship by the time
Metropolitan filed its motion for summary judgment, which made the one year time
limitation inapplicable; at that point, Juanita was seeking to establish her marital status
during the pendency of her relationship with Martin. Nevertheless, if the trial court had
determined that their relationship had terminated, Juanita and Martin were willing to agree
to an extension of time within which to have the marriage adjudication determined. If it had
not been for Metropolitan's acts in intervention, Juanita and Martin's marriage adjudication
would have been determined ultimately by the court.
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 guarantees equal protection to the citizens
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of the State of Utah, and forbids discrimination based upon arbitrary classifications. That
provision states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Case law has
interpreted this section as follows:
What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not
operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not 'treated similarly" or
if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if their circumstances are
the same."
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), citing Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
See also Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348. 352 (Utah 1989). Malan provides:
Statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be
based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives
of the statute.
Id. As stated above, the only legislative purpose for the one year time limitation is to prevent
an adjudication occurring contrary to the intentions of the couple. This objective is not
served through applying the strict limitation to individuals such as Martin and Juanita.

In

the case at bar, Juanita diligently pursued her marriage adjudication, but was unable to obtain
a determination within one year because of circumstances enumerated above. In other cases
there could be numerous reasons why a marriage adjudication proceeding could not be
brought to trial within one year. If a trial judge falls ill at the time of trial, or some other
emergency prevents counsel from attending a scheduled trial, these are also conceivable fact
situations which would result in a petitioner losing her opportunity through no fault of her
own to receive an adjudication of marriage.
There is clearly a legitimate statutory objective in requiring an adjudication
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proceeding to be commenced within one year of the termination of a relationship. Such a
limitation would serve the same purpose that all statutes of limitation serve ~ to prevent stale
claims from being brought where there is no evidence or witnesses to support the claim.
However, to require that a matter be brought to trial within a certain period of time serves no
purpose whatsoever under these circumstances where the petition was filed within the one
year time period, where the parties to the relationship have re-established their relationship,
and neither party to the relationship objects to the marriage adjudication proceedings.
The stated legislative concern in enacting the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is
that an adjudication will occur many years after a relationship has terminated against the
intentions of the couple. Such a concern is adequately addressed by mechanisms which
already exist in civil practice.
The marriage adjudication statute attempts to treat petitioners similarly, who are not
similarly situated. Petitioners whose petitions for adjudication are not contested are treated
the same as petitioners who are subject to a complaint in intervention. Petitioners who do
not object to the adjudication occurring after one year are treated the same as those who
might object to an adjudication past the statutory time limit. The stated legislative purpose
is not served by treating these two groups in a similar manner. It is arbitrary to deny
adjudication of marriage to those petitioners who cannot get a trial date within one year,
while allowing adjudications of uncontested petitions which can easily get to trial prior to
the deadline. It is arbitrary to deny an adjudication to a couple who does not object to the
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hearing occurring more than one year past the termination of their relationship. Such
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law is prohibited by Article I, Section 24 of
the Utah Constitution which requires the uniform application of laws.
C.

The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.

The application of the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 has deprived Juanita
Gonzalez of her property7 and liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. This section provides, "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Case law shows that due
process considerations are similar to equal protection analyses. In the case of Condemarin
v. University Hosp.. 775 P.2d at 356, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Historically, the overlap between equal protection analysis and due process
analysis has been considerable. . . both tests seek to ensure, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, that 'legislative action... be rationally related to the
accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose.'
citing Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049 (1979). The following analysis of the time limitation
provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is based on the standard of review set forth in Celebrity Club.
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), and shows that the
statute violates Juanita's rights to due process and access to courts:
1.

Property Right. Juanita has a property and liberty right in establishing her

marriage to Martin Briceno. The property rights which would inure to Juanita would include
widow's social security benefits based upon Martin's earnings, benefits, inheritance from
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Martin's estate, and interest in marital property acquired during the couple's relationship.
Although the parties are legally married at this time, it would be advantageous to Juanita to
have the couple's prior 13 year relationship legally adjudicated, which will entitle her to
recognition of her contributions to the marriage during that period of time prior to the
adjudication.

In addition, Juanita has a property and liberty right in her marriage

adjudication in that she seeks to gain society's recognition of her long-standing marriage
relationship to Martin Briceno. Juanita and Martin held themselves out as a married couple,
and only a few immediate family members and close, personal friends knew that they had
not gone through a formal ceremony. After Metropolitan intervened in Juanita's marriage
adjudication, Metropolitan informed Juanita's neighbors, the children's school principal, and
personnel at Juanita's Catholic church that she and Martin had never been married.
Metropolitan's actions created embarrassment for Juanita and her children and created even
more reasons for Juanita to pursue her marriage adjudication with Martin; she wanted to save
face in her community and legitimize the status of her three children. These are all important
rights which Juanita seeks to preserve.
2.

Inadequate Notice.

Juanita was not given adequate notice regarding the

applicability of the time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5. The statute does not
address whether individuals seeking marriage adjudication may mutually stipulate to enlarge
the time in which to establish their common law marriage. The statute does not address
whether a third party intervenor may, unilaterally, invoke the statutory time requirements in
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direct contrast to the wishes of the couple seeking marriage adjudication. The statute does
not address whether persons who have alleged termination of their relationship in
contemplation of divorce and who later reconcile but wish to continue their marriage
adjudication proceedings, may amend their petition for marriage adjudication to reflect their
reconciliation, thus making the one year time limitation inapplicable.
The statute, as written, did not provide notice to Juanita that she needed to ask for an
expedited hearing because she would not be allowed to stipulate to extend the time in which
to establish the marriage. Had she known that the time limit would be enforced strictly
against her, she could have objected to the exhaustive discovery performed by Metropolitan,
and she could have asked for a first place trial setting. This lack of notice directly resulted
in the dismissal of Juanita's petition for marriage adjudication.
3.

Inadequate Hearing. Juanita was not given an opportunity to present evidence

of her ongoing relationship with Martin.

The statute does not address under what

circumstances a relationship is deemed irrevocably terminated to make the one year time
limitation provision forever applicable. The statute does not enumerate circumstances that
would support a presumption that a relationship has terminated. The statute does not address
whether a third party may contest a couple's allegations of a continuing relationship. Nor
does the statute provide for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a couple's
relationship has terminated.
The trial court ruled in Metropolitan's favor despite the fact that Metropolitan failed
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to submit any evidence to show that Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated for
purposes of the statute, or that their current relationship was a "new" one. (Record 460)
Metropolitan never produced any evidence whatsoever to support its argument. (Record 230
- 233; Record 460) The trial court made its ruling based on Metropolitan's mere conclusory
statements made at oral argument. (Record 460).
Juanita was never given the opportunity to establish the existence of her ongoing
relationship with Martin at an evidentiary hearing. If an evidentiary hearing had been held,
Juanita would have been given a chance to prove her ongoing relationship by her own
testimony, the testimony of family members and friends, and by way of document production
showing a continuation of their marital reputation, and their commingled finances and family
obligations.
Because the statute is deficient by failing to enumerate particularities as described
above, and because it does not provide for an evidentiary hearing on this pivotal point,
Juanita5s marriage adjudication petition was dismissed for failure to meet the statutory time
limitation.
The time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional both on its face
and as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. The statutory deficiencies discussed above allowed
Juanita to be deprived of her property and liberty interest in establishing her marriage to
Martin Briceno, specifically by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. In
analyzing the time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 under the standards set forth by
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the Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah
1984), in order to be constitutional, there must be a showing of:
(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and
(2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory
purpose". Id. at 206, quoting In re Boyer. 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981). These issues
are discussed as follows:
1.

Does the state have a compelling interest in the result to be achieved? The

state's interest in the timely establishment of a marriage under the statute is to avoid the
societal and economic difficulties inherent in a situation where a party, many years after the
termination of a relationship, desires to establish a marriage where it was never the intent of
the parties to enter into marriage. The state's interest was stated precisely and succinctly
during the Senate debate on Senate Bill 156. (Transcript of Senate Hearing, Addendum
i.)
2.

Are the means adopted narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose?

The means by which the U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) purports to achieve its purpose is by mandating
that a marriage be established within one year from the date a couple's relationship is
terminated. This requirement is overly broad and is not sufficiently narrow to achieve the
basic purpose of the statute. A strict requirement that a marriage be established within one
year fails to consider the following circumstances:
a.

Where a third party intervenes which may require a longer period of time for
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discovery procedures;
b.

Where the parties to a marriage adjudication proceeding wish to stipulate to

enlarge the period of time within which to establish a marriage;
c.

Where the parties file for marriage adjudication in contemplation of divorce* and

who later reconcile but wish to continue with the marriage adjudication;
d.

Where the trial court cannot schedule a trial on the merits within the one year

time period due to scheduling conflicts or other conflicts;
e.

That there are other safeguards in place in the Rules of Civil Procedure which

are designed to facilitate the timely adjudication of lawsuits, which are utilized by the parties
to litigation and on the court's own motion.
The requirement that a marriage be established within one year is not only
burdensome on both the parties to the action and the court calendar, but can result in
the deprivation of constitutional rights as in the present case. A more narrowly
tailored requirement that the petition for marriage adjudication be filed within one
year from the date a relationship terminates will achieve the statutory purpose
intended by the Utah Legislature. The time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5
is unconstitutional in that it is not sufficiently narrow to achieve the statutory purpose.
Even if U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), were not found to be unconstitutional on its face, it is
unconstitutional as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. The Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Social
Services Dept.. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) upheld the constitutionality of the statute
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terminating the parental rights of an unmarried father, but declared the statute to be
unconstitutional as applied to the appellant. The Court held that the statute could not be
applied to deprive the father of his parental rights without a hearing at which he would have
"an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably
have expected his baby to be born in Utah/* Ellis, Id. at 1256. As stated above, the statute
at issue in this appeal, as applied to Juanita Gonzalez, deprived her of due process in that she
was not afforded notice and an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter
that her relationship with Martin had not terminated, but was ongoing.
Juanita has a fundamental right afforded by the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Utah to legitimize her status as a married woman during her
relationship with Martin Briceno, and to legitimize the status of her three children. The time
limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, as applied, bars Juanita from pursuing her property and
liberty rights in having her marriage adjudicated. The law affords no other remedy to
Juanita.
POINT IH
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INTERVENOR'S
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
A.

Legal Standard

The Utah Supreme Court has held:
To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's Findings
of Fact, appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding
42

and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, . .
. The legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined by the. . ."clearly
erroneous" standard. ... A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary
support is deemed "clearly erroneous" only if we conclude that the finding is
against the clear weight of the evidence.
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). The failure to enter adequate
findings of fact on material issues may be reversible error. Id. A finding may be deemed
clearly erroneous either if it is without "adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law." T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 at 909 (Utah App. 1988), quoting
Wright & Miller. Federal Practice & Procedure, §2585, p. 193 (1971).
B.

Metropolitan's Standing to Intervene and the Trial Court's Findings.

Specifically, Juanita Gonzalez challenges the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the trial court in denying Juanita's motion to dismiss the
complaint in intervention:
Finding of Fact #9: There are no facts before the Court to demonstrate that the
petitioner was misled in any way. To the contrary, the letter from
Metropolitan's counsel made clear that in order to claim coverage under the
policy, petitioner would have to first establish her status as the spouse of
Martin Briceno and then would face other policy defenses.
Finding of Fact #10: Metropolitan's interest will be directly affected by any
adjudication in this matter. If petitioner is established as the spouse of Martin
Briceno, she may be entitled to make claim under Martin Briceno's insurance
policy with petitioner.
Conclusion of Law #1: Petitioner has previously stipulated to allow the
Complaint in Intervention in this case. Petitioner has presented no valid legal
basis for her withdrawal of that Stipulation.
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Conclusion of Law #2: Metropolitan falls squarely within Rule 24(a)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding intervention. Petitioner has an
interest relating to the subject matter of this action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as practical matter impair its ability to protect
that interest. Additionally, petitioner's interest is not adequately represented
by any other existing party.
Conclusion of Law #3: Metropolitan has not misled petitioner in any manner
and there is no basis to assert any wrongdoing or other action that would
preclude or estop Metropolitan from pursuing its Complaint in Intervention in
this matter.
C.

Marshaling of Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings.

The following evidence, stated from the defendant's point of view, supports the
challenged Findings of Facts.1
1.

The letter of Robert L. Stevens to Juanita's counsel dated February 23, 1996

states, "As you know, there are other serious questions regarding any coverage Juanita might
have even if it were established that she was the spouse of Martin." This letter was sent to
Juanita's counsel after Metropolitan filed its motion to intervene, but before Juanita
stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention. (Record 304)
2.

Juanita's proof of loss filed with Metropolitan states that she is making a claim

as the innocent spouse of Martin Briceno. The proof of loss form notes "adjudication
pending of spousal status." (Record 277)

Plaintiff hastens to point out that she does not agree that these points are
sustainable or well-taken. However, the requirement is to marshal the evidence in a
manner most favorable to the verdict and the above statements represent the most
favorable manner in which the evidence could be construed as supporting the errant
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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3.

During Juanita's sworn statement of January 29, 1996, she testified that she was

advised by her public adjuster that she should file a marriage adjudication proceeding to
establish her marriage to Martin Briceno. (Record 11-12)
4.

Metropolitan asserted in its complaint in intervention that "Metropolitan believes

that this petition is filed as part of an attempt to defraud an insurance company by falsely
attempting to establish a marriage where none existed." (Record 8)
D.

Evidence Legally Insufficient to Support Findings.

The following evidence demonstrates the lack of the evidentiary support and the
clearly erroneous nature of the findings relating to the trial court's denial of Juanita's motion
to dismiss.
1.

The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to the court below, is

legally insufficient to support the court's findings insofar as they find that Metropolitan's
interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeds was sufficient to support its standing to
intervene. These findings are clearly erroneous, not only because they lack evidentiary
support when the undisputed evidence is viewed fairly, but the findings are based upon an
erroneous view of the law.
A party's right of intervention is determined by Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which allows intervention as stated below:
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject matter of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented
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by existing parties, id
The requisite standing must exist, not only at the outset of intervention, but throughout the
litigation. If a party's interest in the litigation is extinguished, it's interest is rendered moot,
and intervention is no longer appropriate. Mootness is inextricably tied to the doctrine of
standing to assure that the court is presented with a dispute that it is capable of resolving.
As defined by one commentator, mootness is "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation
(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness). Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973).
When Juanita stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention, it was believed hat
Metropolitan had an interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceedings, because Juanita
would be defined as an "insured" under Martin's Metropolitan insurance policy if her
marriage adjudication was successful. However, once Metropolitan unequivocally denied
Juanita's claims, its interest in her marriage adjudication proceeding was rendered moot.
Juanita moved to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of standing to sue
under Rule 24(a) U.R.C.P., and offered into evidence Metropolitan's letter denying coverage
and benefits to Juanita prior to the trial court's ruling on the marriage adjudication.
Thereafter, it was Metropolitan's burden to show that it retained an interest in the
proceedings, and that intervention was necessary to protect its interest.
2.

There is no evidence to support Metropolitan's conclusory allegations that
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following its denial of coverage and benefits to Juanita, it still had an interest in her
marriage adjudication proceedings. On June 4, 1996, Metropolitan denied all coverage
and benefits under the insurance policy to Juanita Gonzalez.

The unequivocal denial of

benefits to Juanita Gonzalez demonstrated that Metropolitan had no direct interest in the
outcome of Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding. Metropolitan resisted Juanita's
motion to dismiss, arguing that it still had an interest in the proceeding, but failed to allege
what its interest was at that point. If Metropolitan meant that an ultimate decision favorable
to Juanita would cause Metropolitan to reverse its denial at a later date and pay benefits to
Juanita, then Metropolitan, arguably, may have retained an interest in the litigation.
However, Metropolitan did not allege this, or any other reason why it still had an interest in
the proceedings after the issuance of its denial letter.
After Metropolitan finally and formally denied benefits to Juanita, without reserving
its rights under the policy, what possible interest did it still have in Juanita's marriage
adjudication proceeding?

Metropolitan asserted in its memorandum in opposition to

Juanita's motion to dismiss that it still had an interest in the litigation; however, it failed to
state what exactly its interest was at that point.
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention alleged that it believed Juanita had filed to
establish a marriage in order to defraud Metropolitan. After Metropolitan's formal denial of
Juanita's claim under the policy, how could the establishment of her marriage thereafter
defraud Metropolitan?

Metropolitan could not possibly have been in danger of being
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defrauded at that point because Metropolitan made it clear that they were never going to pay
her anything! Therefore, if Metropolitan's interest was to avoid being the victim of insurance
fraud (as it alleged in its complaint), its interest was effectively protected by denying
Juanita's claim, because Metropolitan cannot be the victim of insurance fraud when it has
no intention of paying a claim it suspects of being fraudulent! Likewise, there is not one
shred of evidence in the record to support Metropolitan's claim that a disposition of Juanita's
action (after it denied her claim) would impair or impede its ability to protect any claimed
interest in the litigation.

Metropolitan could have submitted affidavits from claims

representatives and/or expert witnesses within the insurance claims industry to show that it
still retained an interest in the proceedings, and to identify what interest it claimed.
Metropolitan failed to claim any potential future injury. Although the intervenor's complaint
alleged that it believed Juanita was attempting to defraud the insurance company,
Metropolitan's argument in opposition to Juanita's motion to dismiss completely failed to
allege what harm it feared.
Furthermore, Metropolitan failed to cite any precedent or discuss any similar cases
on point. The trial record contains only one conclusory statement in Metropolitan's
memorandum in opposition to Juanita's motion to dismiss, "It is readily evident that
Metropolitan has an interest in the transaction which is the subject of this action and that
determination of whether Juanita is the spouse of Martin will as a practical matter impair
Metropolitan's ability to protect its interest." (Record 272) Such an unsupported allegation
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is not sufficient to allow intervention by a third party in a marriage adjudication.
This lack of any evidence shows that the trial court's findings were clearly
erroneous. The trial court erred in not granting Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's
complaint in intervention because there is insufficient evidentiary support for Finding of Fact
No. 10, and Conclusions of Law Nos.i and 2.
3.

Juanita Gonzalez stipulated to allow Metropolitan to intervene under a

mistaken reliance that Metropolitan would pay benefits if the trial court found in favor
of her marriage adjudication. Juanita held this belief because of the prior representation
made to her by a Metropolitan representative. Furthermore, Metropolitan alleged in its
motion to intervene that "Juanita's only hope of establishing any insurance coverage under
the Metropolitan policy depends on her claimed status as a spouse of Martin Briceno."
(Record 10 - 15) The clear implication of Metropolitan's allegation is that a judicial
determination of Juanita's marital status would determine Metropolitan's obligations under
the policy, and that the issue of her marital status was the only determinative factor.
On Feburary 23, 1996 Metropolitan sent a letter to counsel stating, " . . . with the issue
of her [Juanita's] marital status before the Court, it would be inappropriate for Metropolitan
to make any payment at this time." (Emphasis Added) (Record 304) Once again,
Metropolitan's communication with Juanita centers the question of payment to her around
the determination of her martial status. The last paragraph of Metropolitan's letter is a
general non-waiver included as a matter of course in most insurance matters where coverage
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is at issue; however. Metropolitan never at any time verbally discussed or communicated to
Juanita in writing any other defenses they intended to raise to her insurance claim.
Based on the aforementioned verbal and written communications, and court pleadings
filed by Metropolitan, Juanita stipulated to the intervention believing that if she prevailed in
her marriage adjudication proceeding, Metropolitan would pay her claim.
When Metropolitan denied Juanita's claim on June 4, 1996, it did so based upon its
own assessment of her marital status "among other things." This shows that, in fact,
"Juanita's only hope of establishing any insurance coverage under the Metropolitan policy"
did not depend at all "on her claimed status as a spouse of Martin Briceno." (Quotations
taken from page 4 of Metropolitan's Memorandum in support of its motion to intervene.
Record 10 - 15, Record 259) Contrary to its prior verbal and written assurances and
allegations, Metropolitan did not await the trial court's ruling before determining their
obligations under the policy.
Had Metropolitan been forthcoming in its motion to intervene, and had it revealed
its true intention to deny benefits to Juanita regardless of the trial court's ruling, Juanita
would never have stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention. Metropolitan mislead Juanita
into believing that it would pay or deny her claim based on the trial court's ruling.
The issue of an insurance carrier's intervention in litigation has been addressed by this
Court in limited circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that an insurance carrier may
intervene in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist. See Lima v. Chambers.
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657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). The Court, in acknowledging an insurer's right to intervene,
stated that uto justify intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct
interest in the subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be
affected, for good or for ill." Lima, Id. at 282, quoting State v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343
(Mo.App. (1963). The Court reasoned that the insurer was bound by the trial court's ruling
pursuant to Utah statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage, and therefore had a direct
interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. The Court stated:
.. .[the required] interest does not include a mere, consequential, remote or
conjectural possibility of being in some manner affected by the result of the
original action. It must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the
judgment to be rendered". Lima, Id. at 282. (Emphasis Added).
The case at bar is distinguished from Lima and its progeny in that Metropolitan had
no statutorily mandated interest in the subject matter, i.e. there is no state law requiring an
insurer to automatically cover a spouse's property under a homeowner's insurance policy,
whereas in Lima, the uninsured motorist statute acted to bind the insurer to the court's ruling.
Therefore, in order for Metropolitan to qualify as having a direct interest in the subject matter
of the action, Metropolitan asserted that it would be bound by the trial court's decision, and
would recognize its contractual obligation to pay Juanita in the event she was found to be
the wife of Martin Briceno. When Metropolitan thereafter denied benefits to Juanita prior
to the trial court's ruling, it effectively demonstrated that it had no intention to be bound by
the court's ruling.
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Metropolitan's interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding was, at most,
a mere, consequential or remote interest. Metropolitan could only conjecture the possibility
of being in some manner affected by the result of Juanita's marriage adjudication
proceedings. It wrongfully gained intervention in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding
by taking the position that it would be bound by the trial court's ruling.
In considering the issue of intervention in Lima, the Utah Supreme Court looked to
other states' decisions, and relied on many Missouri cases, including Alsbach v. Bader. 616
S.W.2d 147 (Mo.App. 1981), addressing whether an auto insurer should be allowed to
intervene in an uninsured motorist action. In Alsbach, Id., the Missouri Supreme Court
stated that "only if we were to find the insurer would not be bound could we stop the insurer
from intervening." Alsbach, Id. at 155. In the case at bar, Metropolitan has failed to assert
how it will be affected by any decision in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding now
that it has denied her claim. Furthermore, it is now clear that it never intended to be bound
by the trial court's ruling.
Under these circumstances, the lower court erred in not granting Juanita's motion to
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention, and specifically erred in Finding of Fact
No. 9 and Conclusion of Law No. 3. The record shows there are ample facts to demonstrate
that Juanita was misled by Metropolitan in stipulating to the intervention.
The trial court further erred in denying Juanita's objections to the findings, and its
denial of her motion to alter the findings for the aforementioned reasons, and based upon the
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evidence on record.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
JUANITA'S MOTION TO AMEND HER PETITION
A.

Legal Standard, The trial court's denial of motion to amend a pleading will

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging Specialists,
Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389
(Utah 1996). The proper legal standard in determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous
is a showing that the finding is without "adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law." T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 at 909 (Utah App. 1988), quoting
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 2585, p. 193 (1971).
B.

Juanita's Motion to Amend and The Trial Court's Findings.

Appellant challenges primarily Findings of Fact Nos. 8 and 9, and Conclusions of Law
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, set forth as follows:
Finding of Fact No. 8: The Court finds that petitioner had a relationship with
Martin Briceno commencing September 1983 that terminated no later than
October 21, 1995.
Finding of Fact No. 9: The Court finds that petitioner may have commenced
a new relationship with Martin Briceno in the spring of 1997 but that under the
facts presented and petitioner's own recently filed affidavit, her prior
relationship with Martin Briceno ended no later than October 21, 1995.
Conclusion of Law No. 1: Petitioner's relationship with Martin Briceno
commenced September 1983 and terminated (as that term is utilized in Section
30-1-4.5 Utah Code Annotated) no later than October 21, 1995. The fact that
petitioner may have commenced a new relationship with Martin Briceno in the
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spring of 1997 does not alter the fact that her previous relationship under the
statute was terminated.
Conclusion of Law No. 2: The facts before the Court demonstrate that
petitioner's proposed amendment would be futile, there being no facts to
support a continuous relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended
petition.
Conclusion of Law No. 3: The allowance of the proposed amendment at this
late date would be prejudicial to the complainant in intervention in view of the
fact that the discovery cutoff date has passed and a trial date set.
C.

Marshaling of Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings.

The following evidence, stated from the defendant's point of view, supports the
challenged Findings of Facts.2
1.

Juanita alleged in her petition for marriage adjudication that her relationship

with Martin Briceno terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of the fire. (Record 1-2)
2.

On January 29, 1996 Juanita gave a sworn statement to Metropolitan, testifying

that her relationship with Martin Briceno ended in June 1995. (Record 460, p. 5)
3.

On December 19,1996 the parties stipulated to allow Juanita to filed an amended

petition for marriage adjudication. (Record 133 -134) However, an amended petition was
never filed.
4.

Juanita never alleged any confusion or misunderstanding in the preparations of

2

Plaintiff hastens to point out that she does not agree that these points are
sustainable or well-taken. However, the requirement is to marshal the evidence in a
manner most favorable to the verdict and the above statements represent the most
favorable manner in which the evidence could be construed as supporting the errant
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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her previous petitions or in her testimony. (Record 460, Record 1-2, Record 185 -187,
Record 204 - 205, Record 206 - 208)
D,

The Evidence is Legally Insufficient to Support the Findings.

The following evidence demonstrates the lack of the evidentiary support and the
clearly erroneous nature of the findings relating to the trial court's denial of Juanita's motion
to amend.
The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to the court below, is legally
insufficient to support the court's findings that Juanita and Martin had terminated their
relationship on October 21, 1995 within the meaning of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5. Juanita and
Martin began living together in 1983, and produced two sons and a daughter together,
Adrian, Jaime and Theresa Briceno. The couple always maintained a family residence.
However, the nature of Juanita and Martin's relationship is not unlike many marital
relationships that are less than perfect. The facts in evidence show that Juanita and Martin's
relationship included brief periods of estrangement, however they always reconciled and
resumed their marital relationship. Juanita has been consistent in describing her relationship
with Martin. Her testimony and the facts in evidence support her allegations of a continuing
relationship with Martin.
Following the fire Metropolitan took three recorded statements from Juanita. She
testified during a sworn statement on January 29,1996. During these interviews, Juanita has
consistently described her relationship with Martin Briceno as a stormy one.
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She was

forthcoming about the fact that she and Martin had been estranged for periods of time in the
past when he left the family home, but always returned. She was emphatic that Martin never
moved his possessions out of the house or changed his address. Although she was angry
enough with Martin to consider the relationship permanently terminated in October of 1995,
her feelings subsequently changed, as feelings do. In the spring of 1996 Juanita and Martin
reconciled. She told him that she was going to withdraw her petition for a divorce in
connection with the marriage adjudication proceedings.

The

record

shows

that

Juanita's relationship with Martin has been continuous and ongoing since September 1983,
despite their domestic difficulties and periods of estrangement. There were no intervening
engagements, or marriages with third parties. The nature of Martin and Juanita's relationship
from the date of its inception through October 21, 1995, the date of the fire, is not different
from the nature of their relationship from October 21, 1995 to the present. From September
1983 to the present the couple's relationship has consistently included disputes, arguments,
and times that the couple declared it to be "over." The fact that it was not over is obvious
from the fact that the couple is now legally married.
It is important to note that Metropolitan has not disputed that Juanita and Martin's
relationship existed on October 21, 1995. Metropolitan's only dispute is that it was a
relationship qualifying for marriage adjudication. The evidence shows that the general nature
of Juanita and Martin's relationship did not change after the fire. They resumed their pattern
of interaction and reconciled as they had done numerous times before.
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The trial court disregarded the evidence of Juanita and Martin's history together
showing that Juanita* s prior testimony is consistent with the nature of her relationship with
Martin. The notion that each time Juanita and Martin reconciled their differences following
a domestic dispute sparked the commencement of a "new relationship" completely ignores
the very real nature of an ongoing martial relationship with good periods of time separated
by bad, and sometimes tragic, episodes.
The determination of whether or not an individual is in a relationship is highly
subjective, and therefore the testimony of the party involved in the relationship should be
given great weight; certainly more weight than the testimony of an insurance company
attempting to discredit the relationship.
Furthermore, the trial court's finding that Metropolitan would be prejudiced by
allowing Juanita to amend her petition is not only completely without evidentiary support,
but prejudice was never alleged by Metropolitan, either in its memorandum opposing the
motion, or at oral argument. The word "prejudice" with regard to Metropolitan does not
appear anywhere in Metropolitan's memorandum (Record 230 - 233) or in the transcript of
the hearing.(Record 460) The first time any notion of prejudice was raised was in
Metropolitan's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law! The trial court erroneously
adopted this finding without considering the fact that the issue of prejudice had not been
raised in the pleadings or at oral argument.
E.

The Findings were Induced by an Erroneous View of the Law.
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Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the amendment of pleadings.
It states in relevant part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires..."
Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition
to state that she and Martin had not terminated their relationship. The plain language of Rule
15(a) mandates that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. Justice
required that Juanita's constitutional rights be protected, and the trial court's ruling failed to
protect her rights. Instead, the trial court ruled that the proposed amendment "at this late
date would be prejudicial to the complainant in intervention in view of the fact that the
discovery cutoff date has passed and a trial date set". Conclusion of Law No. 3. (Record 424
-428)
The trial date was scheduled for August 5, 1997. Juanita filed to amend her petition
on April 23, 1997, four months before the scheduled trial. Furthermore, Metropolitan was
informed at the pretrial settlement conference on April 8, 1997 that Juanita and Martin had
reconciled. The trial court heard Juanita's motion on June 30,1997. Although the discovery
cut off date had passed by the date of the hearing, Metropolitan failed to show how it would
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have been prejudiced by allowing an amendment. In fact. Metropolitan never alleged that
it would be prejudiced if Juanita were allowed to amend her petition.
Utah law is clear that in considering motions to amend, the primary consideration is
whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party receives an
unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the case at bar, Metropolitan failed to show that it would not be
able to meet any new issue presented by Juanita5s proposed amendment, or that it would be
disadvantaged by the amendment. Juanita was not attempting to add additional parties or
new causes of action or theories of recovery. Her proposed amendment did not go the merits
of her case. Her proposed amendment would not have delayed the scheduled trial.
Juanita did not seek to change any liability sought against Metropolitan or Martin
Briceno. In Wells v. Wells. 272 P.2d 67 (Utah, 1954), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
an amendment may be allowed if it does not change the liability sought to be enforced
against the defendant. The court stated that even if the amendment created a new cause of
action, amendment should be allowed if the new cause of action is not wholly different from
those already alleged. Wells. Id. at 170. Juanita5s proposed amendment is completely in
keeping with the causes of action alleged in her original petition.
Juanita filed her motion to amend in April 1997, four months prior to trial, and two
months prior to the discovery cut off date. Juanita alleges that the filing of this motion was
not untimely. However, if the Court finds that the motion was made untimely, the Court
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should also find that the untimeliness was justified. In Chadwick v. Neilsen. 763 P.2d 817
(Ct. App. Utah 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals held that there are occasions where justice
excuses untimeliness:
A motion to amend raised shortly before or at trial, in response to facts
discovered subsequent to the prior pleading, should be allowed if there is a
reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the
amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing party.
Id. at 820, quoting Girard v. Applebv. 660 P.3d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
Juanita sought to amend her petition to reflect current factual data which did not exist
at the time of her original petition for marriage adjudication. Her motion, memorandum in
support thereof, and her affidavit filed in opposition to Metropolitan's motion for summary
judgment all provided adequate explanation for her motivation in seeking an amendment and
the reason for the timeliness of her motion.
Metropolitan did not present any evidence to support a claim that it needed more time
for discovery due to the amendment. Because the two issues are inextricably linked, the
same evidence required to prove or disprove the existence of a marriage is the same evidence
required to prove or disprove a continuation of the relationship. For the reasons set forth
above, the trial court erred in denying Juanita5 s motion to amend.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING METROPOLITAN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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A.

Legal Standard. Summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows

that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
Paving, Inc. V. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
On review of a grant of summary judgment, the inquiry is whether there is any
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Because
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's
ruling for correctness, White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994), and gives no
deference to the trial court's legal determinations, Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. Utah 1993).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d231, 233 (Utah 1993).
B.

Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court's Conclusions

of Law,
Juanita challenges the following conclusion of law made by the trial court:
Conclusion of Law No. 7: Petitioner is not and has never been married to
Martin Briceno in any solemnized or unsolemnized relationship.
C.

Marshaling of Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law.

Appellant marshals the following evidence to support the trial court's order granting
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summary judgment and for the conclusion of law challenged:
1.

U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) states that an adjudication of marriage must be established

either during the relationship or within one year following the termination of the relationship.
(Addendum A)
2.

Juanita alleged in her original petition that her relationship with Martin

terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of the fire. (Record 1-2)
3.

Juanita testified in a sworn statement taken by counsel for Metropolitan before

it became a party in intervention, that her relationship with Martin terminated in June of
1995. (Record 460, p. 5)
4.

At no time during the pendency of her marriage adjudication proceeding did

Juanita apply to the trial court for an accelerated trial setting. (Entire Record)
5.

The trial on Juanita's petition for marriage adjudication was not held within one

year from October 21, 1995. (Entire Record)
6.

Juanita did not establish her marriage with Martin within one year from October

21, 1995. (Entire Record)
D.

There is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment
The parties dispute whether Juanita established a "new" relationship with Martin after

their reconciliation, or whether their reconciliation was a continuation of their 13 year
relationship. This disputed fact is material inasmuch as the statute requires that a common
law marriage be established within one year following the termination of a relationship.
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Juanita's affidavit testimony in opposition to Metropolitan's motion for summary
judgment states that she and Martin reconciled to re-establish their relationship. Her
pleadings and testimony allege that the relationship, in fact, never ended and was continuing
and ongoing.
Metropolitan disputed Juanita's claim that her relationship with Martin did not
terminate. However, Metropolitan did not file any affidavits, or submit any evidence, to
oppose Juanita's testimony. Metropolitan simply relied on the averments of Juanita's initial
pleadings which stated that the relationship had terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of
the fire.
At oral argument, counsel for Metropolitan did not dispute that Juanita and Martin had
reconciled, but disputed that the reconciliation showed a continuation of the relationship.
Metropolitan produced no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.
The record of the oral argument shows that the issue was disputed. After counsel for
Juanita argued for amendment of her petition based on the fact that Juanita had reconciled
with Martin, counsel for Metropolitan argued his position that Juanita and Martin's
relationship had terminated, and that she should not be allowed to assert otherwise. At the
June 30, 1997 hearing, counsel for Metropolitan stated:
[Mr. Stevens:] Your Honor, you articulated some of our concerns here. The
facts, I don't think, are really in dispute. Some of the timing is. (Emphasis
Added). (Record 460, p. 5)
The timing which counsel for Metropolitan admits is in dispute is the very essence of
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Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. (Record 177 -178; Record 179 -184)
Mr. Stevens then brought to the court's attention that as part of Metropolitan's
investigation of the fire, and before its intervention in the marriage adjudication proceedings,
he took Juanita's sworn statement. (Record 460, p. 5) Mr. Stevens stated to the court that
during her sworn statement Juanita testified that she thought her relationship with Martin was
over in June 1995, but that they subsequently got back together. Metropolitan's own
argument brings to light the nature of the couple's relationship, and the fact that Juanita had
previously, albeit erroneously, thought her relationship with Martin had ended, when in fact
it had not. Counsel for Metropolitan then argued these very facts to the contrary:
[Mr. Stevens]: I will accept her statement that she has renewed her
relationship. I am not going to question that here today, but the facts don't
show they meant this kind of continuing relationship she is alleging. (Record
460, p. 8)
Although counsel for Metropolitan opined that the facts do not show that Juanita's
renewal of her relationship with Martin meant a continuing relationship, his opinion flies in
the face of the facts which he brought to the trial court's attention just minutes before. The
facts show that Juanita had a history of estrangement and reconciliation with Martin, which
history would have been made even clearer to the court at an evidentiary hearing or a trial
on the merits.
Metropolitan did not dispute that Juanita had renewed her relationship with Martin.
It disputed that it was a continuing relationship. As the moving party, Metropolitan had the
burden to prove that the renewal of Juanita and Martin's relationship did not constitute a
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continuing relationship. Metropolitan failed to provide the court with any evidence to show
it was not a continuing relationship. There are no facts m existence to support Metropolitan's
argument that it was not a continuing relationship. Evidence tending to conclusively
establish that a couple had terminated their relationship would include evidence showing that
one of the parties had been or was engaged to marry someone else, or had entered into a
lawful marriage with someone else, or had lived with or was currently living with someone
else in a sexual relationship. Further evidence showing a discontinuance of a relationship
would be evidence that the woman took someone else's last name as her own, or that she
represented herself to be married to someone else. There was absolutely no evidence of this
nature before the Court. Metropolitan failed to establish this essential element of its claim
for summary judgment.
E. The Trial Court's Erroneous View of the Law.
In making its determination that Juanita terminated her relationship with Martin on
October 21, 1995, the trial court erroneously relied on Juanita's seemingly inconsistent
statements. Juanita testified in her sworn statement during Metropolitan's investigation of
the fire, and before Metropolitan intervened, that her relationship with Martin had terminated
on October 21,1995, and she alleged the same in her original petition. After she reconciled
with Martin she submitted an affidavit stating that their relationship had not terminated. The
trial court denied Juanita's motion to amend, and subsequently granted Metropolitan's
motion for summary judgment, based on its erroneous view that it could not accept the
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seemingly inconsistent testimony submitted in Juanita*s subsequent affidavit:
In this court's view, when you examine the affidavit of Ms. Gonzalez, it
clearly states that she considered the relationship permanently terminated on
October 21, 1995. In this court's view, that is the best scenario for Ms.
Gonzalez. The original petition said that the relationship was terminated on
that date. There was an amended petition that said the same thing.
In addition to the sworn statement which, while the statements vary, like I say
in its best light, it embraces a termination date on the 21st of October, 1995.
It would be totally inconsistent with, in this court's view, the overwhelming
assertions by Ms. Gonzalez to allow the amendment. For those reasons, the
court is going to deny the Motion to Amend. (Record 460, p. 9)
The trial court's view is contrary to Utah common law. The Utah Supreme Court has
addressed whether an affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, which
is contrary to the affiant's prior testimony, may create an issue of fact precluding summary
judgment.
In Webster v.SilL 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
circumstances in which it is appropriate to rely on a subsequent, inconsistent affidavit:
The rule that a moving party may not rely upon his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition must be administered with care.... The rule that a
party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts his deposition to
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment does not apply
when there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony
was in error for reasons that appear in the deposition or the party
deponent is able to state in his affidavit an adequate explanation for the
contradictory answer in his deposition. (Emphasis Added).
Webster. Id. at 1172. In the case at bar, Juanita believed her testimony was correct when she
stated her relationship with Martin terminated on October 21, 1995, but subsequent events
proved her statements to be in error. The nature of the couple's stormy relationship, and the
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lack of any evidence suggesting she had not continued her relationship with Martin
substantiates the likelihood that her prior testimony was in error. Furthermore, Juanita's
affidavit clearly explains the discrepancy. The following paragraphs are taken from her
affidavit:
3. Martin and I have had stormy periods of time in our relationship, and we
have broken up and reunited several times in the past.
4. On October 21, 1995, when Martin burned down our family home and all
our possessions, I considered our relationship permanently terminated.
5. Since that time, I have re-established a relationship with Martin and have
been working with his attorney to prevent his deportation from the United
States.
6. I have submitted papers to the Utah State Prison for leave to marry Martin.
7. I intend to marry Martin as soon as possible, because I can't wait any
longer for the adjudication to go through. (Record 185 -187)
This explanation satisfies the requirement set forth in Webster, Id. At the hearing, counsel
for Juanita explained the change in her testimony:
There is a period of time she really didn't want to have that much to do with
him, but that has changed and she wants him now and plans on marrying him.
And as far as I can see, the relationship has not ended. They have there [sic]
typical ups and downs. The typical things which you find is in every
relationship. Where there is separation, the parties say its over. That doesn't
mean it is over. If the relationship continues, it continues. And it is good
public policy to allow a couple who say their relationship is continuing, to be
able to legitimize that marriage and legitimize the children's status and allow
the marriage to be adjudicated and allow the petition to be amended. (Record
460, p. 5)
The instant case is further distinguished from Webster. Id., in that Juanita's affidavit
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was not submitted to contradict facts which existed at the time of her prior testimony — her
affidavit averred that the facts had changed. Counsel for Juanita brought this distinction to
the court's attention:
.. .Yes, she said it was over. That is how she felt at the time. I think that it a
different kind of a situation than changing your testimony as to the facts and
whether the facts were facts which were read or the facts were in the colloquy.
I think it is more akin to people who are afraid of dogs after a dog bite. And
in a year or so they are over it and say, "I am not afraid of dogs anymore."
I think a person is entitled to change their feelings and this statute particularly
is enacted to accommodate a couple by saying it is good if a couple say they
haven't broken up. We should believe them. (Record 460, p. 3)
In Gawv. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Ct. App. Utah 1990), the Court of Appeals considered
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. In Gaw, Id., the
plaintiff alleged personal injuries as a result of faulty road design by the State of Utah. She
repeatedly testified at her deposition that she was not confused by the intersection where the
accident happened. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the facts to
which plaintiff testified in her original deposition. The plaintiff opposed summary judgment,
and in support thereof filed an affidavit which contained averments contradicting her original
deposition testimony. The trial court disregarded plaintiffs affidavit and granted summary
judgment. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs subsequent affidavit,
although directly contradicting her deposition testimony, was properly before the trial court
and raised issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Relying on Webster v. Sill
the Court held that Gaw's affidavit was properly before the court because, unlike the affidavit
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in Webster, plaintiffs affidavit

w4

did not wholly fail to explain the discrepancy". Gaw, 798

P.2d at 1140. The Court went on to explain that at the time of the taking of her deposition,
plaintiff assumed certain facts regarding the layout of the intersection and the lane in which
in the accident happened and her testimony reflected her assumptions: later, the plaintiff
discovered her assumptions were incorrect and attempted to change her testimony
accordingly. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, stating:
Although the trial court in this case apparently did not believe Gaw's
explanation for the discrepancies, we find her explanation is not inherently
inconsistent with the responses in her initial deposition. We do not have to be
persuaded by the explanation or even find it compelling. As long as it is
plausible, the fact finding should be allowed to weigh the credibility of the
explanation.
See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1141.
This instant case is similar to Gaw, Id., in that Juanita assumed her relationship with
Martin was over at the time Metropolitan took her sworn statement. Her assumption
continued until she and Martin reconciled.

Juanita's subsequent reconciliation (and

subsequent lawful marriage) with Martin is a fact which substantiates that her prior testimony
was based on her incorrect assumption that their relationship was irreconcilable and
permanently terminated. Because her prior testimony was based on her incorrect assumption,
the contradictory facts averred to in her affidavit sufficiently raise a genuine issue of material
fact.
Furthermore, the explanation contained in Juanita's affidavit is plausible, which
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should have precluded summary judgment. The trial court applied an incorrect standard in
its view of Juanita's affidavit. Rather than considering whether the explanation for Juanita's
affidavit testimony was plausible, the trial court incorrectly weighed the evidence and
Juanita's credibility.
F. The trial court erred in not viewing the facts and inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to Juanita Gonzalez.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Contrary to well established principles
of law, the trial court in the case at bar did not view the inferences of Juanita's testimony in
a light which was favorable to her, let alone in a light most favorable to her. The issue of
whether this was a new or continuing relationship has been discussed in detail in a preceding
section of this brief. In the context of whether to grant or deny a motion for summary
judgment, the arguments are even stronger that the court should have accepted Juanita's
uncontested and unrefuted testimony that she considered her relationship with Martin to be
a continuing relationship, not a "new" one. There were no intervening events which would
signify that Martin and Juanita's relationship had terminated, other than Juanita's own belief
that proved to be erroneous. Evidence of an intervening marriage to a third person, or
evidence of co-habitation, or an engagement to a third person, would have supported
Metropolitan's claim that Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated, and
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that their subsequent reconciliation was a "new" relationship. Evidence of any of these events
may have been enough to contravene Juanita's testimony. However, in the absence of any
evidence, Juanita's testimony should have been considered sufficient to defeat the motion
for summary judgment.
G. The Trial Court Erred in Weighing the Credibility of Juanita's Testimony.
During oral argument, counsel for Metropolitan insinuated that Juanita was not being
truthful in her affidavit. Mr. Stevens told the court, "I think it just doesn't stand up the smell
test..." (Record 460, p. 7) It is a well established principle of law that a credibility issue
cannot be determined on summary judgment. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.
1996); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). If the trial court had any doubts
that Juanita's affidavit was truthful, summary judgment should have been denied so that a
full trial on the merits could establish whether or not her testimony was truthful. Affidavits
submitted on summary judgment motions are to aid the court in determining whether there
are any material facts in dispute. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967).
Juanita's affidavit showed that the parties disputed that her relationship with Martin had
terminated. The trial court erroneously weighed the evidence presented by Juanita's affidavit
and concluded that Juanita had not continued her relationship with Martin. The trial court
concluded that Juanita and Martin had never been married based on its finding that Juanita
and Martin's relationship had terminated October 21, 1995 and their marriage had not been
adjudicated within one year from that date. (Record 429 - 433; Record 434 - 436)
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H.

The Trial Court's Erroneous View of the Law Permitting Metropolitan's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court allowed Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based on the
affirmative defense that Juanita had not met the statutory time limitation.

Because

Metropolitan had not asserted this defense prior to the motion, and had not amended its
complaint to include the defense, Metropolitan should have been estopped from raising it on
a motion for summary judgment. Metropolitan did not, at any time, preserve the defense of
timeliness under U.C.A. §30-1.4.5. Metropolitan did not set forth this defense in its
complaint in intervention (Record 5 - 9), nor did it seek to amend its complaint to preserve
this defense.
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that affirmative defenses must
be set forth in the pleadings, and if not set forth, they are waived. The result of failure to
plead, and failure to provide notice to the opposing party is that the defense is waived. See
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). In Staker, Id.,
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to amend its answer to include the statute of
limitations defense, when the motion was made on the morning of trial. The Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, noting that the defendant failed to raise the defense
in its original answer to the complaint, and failed to amend the answer prior to trial. Id. at
1189. Metropolitan raised the issue of timeliness under the statute for the first time in its
motion for summary judgment dated April 10, 1997. (Record 177 - 178) Had Juanita
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known from the outset that Metropolitan would seek dismissal of the petition after October
of 1996, Juanita could have asked for an expedited hearing prior to October 1996. Both
parties agreed to a scheduling order and trial date which put the adjudication hearing after
October of 1996, and yet, only after the first trial date was continued by the court, did
Metropolitan raise the issue that Juanita was beyond one year of the termination of her
relationship with Martin, and only after Metropolitan had been informed that Juanita and
Martin had reconciled. (Record 460, p. 2)
The one-year time limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is an affirmative defense which
must be set forth in the pleadings or it should be considered waived. The purpose of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to pleadings is to allow all parties to have full and fair
notice of claims and defenses. By not pleading this specific defense, Metropolitan deprived
Juanita of the opportunity to have her petition determined prior to the one year cutoff, or to
obtain a stipulation to extend the hearing beyond the time limitation. For these reasons, the
court's order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and
Juanita should be allowed to proceed with her petition for adjudication of marriage.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's orders
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, denying Juanita's motion to dismiss
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention and denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition,
and further should find the time limitation provision in the marriage adjudication statute to
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be unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to Juanita Gonzalez.
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